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PREVIEW; State v. Peoples: Unreasonable Supervision and The 
Constitutional Limits of a Probation Search 
Alex Butler* 
The Montana Supreme Court is set to hear oral argument on this 
matter Wednesday, July 7, 2021, at 9:30 a.m. in the Courtroom of the 
Montana Supreme Court, Joseph P. Mazurek Justice Building, Helena, 
Montana. Kathryn Hutchison is likely to appear on behalf of Appellant 
Arthur Ray Peoples (“Peoples”) and C. Mark Fowler is likely to appear on 
behalf of Appellee Montana (“State”).  
I. INTRODUCTION 
This case presents a question about the nature of the State’s 
intrusion during a probation search. Specifically, the Court will decide 
whether Missoula Probation and Parole’s probation search was a 
constitutionally reasonable warrantless intrusion. This case presents the 
opportunity for the Court to determine the limits of a warrantless probation 
search and the scope of a probationer’s privacy interest during a search.  
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In 2003, Arthur Ray Peoples was convicted of operation of an 
unlawful clandestine laboratory and criminal possession of dangerous 
drugs.1 The district court sentenced Peoples to the maximum sentence of 
twenty years imprisonment for the clandestine laboratory offense, with 
five years suspended, plus a concurrent five-year sentence for the 
possession of dangerous drugs offense.2 In August 2008, Peoples was 
paroled from his custodial sentence to Probation and Parole.3 In September 
2017, he transitioned to probation after his prison term expired to serve the 
remaining suspended time.4  
Probation Officer (“P.O.”) Sam Stricker supervised Peoples while 
on parole and probation.5 Peoples admitted to methamphetamine use on 
multiple occasions which required interventions by P.O. Stricker.6 During 
an October 2017 meeting, Peoples admitted to relapse and was referred to, 
and successfully completed, the Enhanced Supervision Program (“ESP”).7 
 
* J.D. Candidate, Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the University of Montana Class of 2022. 
1 Brief of Appellant at 1, State v. Peoples, (Mont. Oct. 2, 2020) (No. 19-0070). 
2 Id. 
3 Brief of Appellee at 2, State v. Peoples, (Mont. Feb. 26, 2021) (No. 19-0070).  
4 Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 4.  
5 Id.  
6 Id.; Brief of Appellee, supra note 3, at 3. 
7 Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 4.  




Peoples voluntarily complied with multiple home visits.8 The most recent 
occurring in February 2018.9 
On March 15, 2018, Lisa Peoples, Peoples’ wife,10 called P.O. 
Stricker and told him that she believed Peoples was using drugs and that 
he might have overdosed.11 Ms. Peoples also stated that she had seen blood 
in his apartment.12 Ms. Peoples had called P.O. Stricker in the past to 
report Peoples’ drug use, and her reports had often been true.13 After this 
call, P.O. Stricker did not call Peoples to check in on him or to make a 
request for a home visit.14 
On March 16, 2018, P.O. Stricker elicited additional support from 
two other probation officers and an agent from the U.S. Marshal’s service 
to conduct the probation search.15 Probation and Parole gained forced 
entry permission and requested a U.S. Marshal’s assistance because they 
are trained for forced entries.16  
Later that day, P.O. Stricker and his team arrived at Peoples’ 
residence, knocked on his front door, and announced their presence.17 
Peoples did not answer the knock at the door.18 Then, P.O. Stricker 
requested a key to Peoples’ apartment from Peoples’ landlord.19 Peoples’ 
landlord provided a spare key to P.O. Stricker.20 P.O. Stricker and his team 
unlocked the front door with the key and entered the residence with guns 
drawn.21 Officers found Peoples sitting on his bed, naked.22 They 
handcuffed him to his bed and holstered their guns.23 Officers discovered 
drug paraphernalia and a white crystalline substance later proved to be 
methamphetamine on his bed stand.24 
The State petitioned to revoke Peoples’ suspended sentence due 
to alleged compliance violations for failing to answer his door, using 
 
8 Id. 
9 Id. at 4–5. 
10 Brief of Appellee, supra note 3, at 4. 
11 Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 5. 
12 Brief of Appellee, supra note 3, at 4. 
13 Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 5. 
14 Id. 
15 Brief of Appellee, supra note 3, at 4. 
16 Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 6 n. 2. 
17 Id. at 6. 
18 Id.  
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 6–7. 
22 Id. at 7. 
23 Brief of Appellee, supra note 3, at 5. 
24 Brief of Appellant, supra note 3, at 4–5. 




drugs, and violating the law through possession of methamphetamine.25 
The district court denied Peoples’ motion to suppress and held that the 
incident was not a home visit, but a probation search, and the nature of the 
State’s intrusion was reasonable because the search was supported by 
reasonable suspicion.26 The district court found Peoples in violation of all 
three Counts and revoked his suspended sentence.27 The district court 
sentenced Peoples to the Department of Corrections for four years and 
three months, with credit for time served.28 This appeal follows Peoples’ 
sentencing.29 
III. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A. Appellant Arthur Ray Peoples 
Peoples primarily argues that the State’s probation search violated 
his right to privacy and to be free from unreasonable searches under the 
Montana Constitution.30 He contends that the nature of the State’s 
intrusion into his home was “outrageously disproportionate” to the 
suspicion of drug use which initially justified the search.31 Specifically, 
Peoples claims that a “team of government agents coerced [his] landlord, 
forced entry into his home, brandished semi-automatic pistols, shackled 
him naked, and left him on the floor that way for thirty minutes.”32 Peoples 
relies on33 both Article II, Section 10’s heightened privacy interests34 and 
Section 11’s reasonableness clause.35  
First, Peoples argues that his past supervisory relationship with 
P.O. Stricker was cooperative and did not justify the degree of force used 
during the probation search.36 Peoples asserts that he reported regularly, 
admitted to relapses, successfully completed ESP, never refused consent 
to home visits, and “did not deny his addiction, nor resist [P.O.] Stricker’s 
intervention[s].”37 He further contends that even though his probation 
conditions have diminished his expectation of privacy, they do not justify 
this type of intrusion into his home.38  
 
25 Id. at 2. 
26 Id. at 3. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 4. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 11. 
31 Id. at 13. 
32 Id. at 10. 
33 Id. at 12. 
34 MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10. 
35 MONT. CONST. art. II, § 11. 
36 Brief of Appellant, supra note 3, at 13. 
37 Id. at 15–16.  
38 Id. at 16. 




Second, Peoples argues that Probation and Parole’s intrusion 
exceeded the nature and scope of a reasonable probation search.39 He 
contends that the search of his home was both harassing and intimidating 
because the intrusion was disproportionate to the report of drug use.40 
Peoples asserts that while he did not answer the door when officers 
knocked and announced their presence, they still planned in advance to 
carry out a forcible entry with multiple officers.41 
Peoples concludes that the search was a disproportionate intrusion 
into his home, and even though his expectation of privacy was diminished, 
the degree of intrusion was not justified.42 Peoples asks the Court to 
reverse the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress and remand for 
further proceedings.43 
B. Appellee State of Montana 
The State argues that the probation search was conducted in a 
constitutionally permissible manner.44 First, the State argues the probation 
search was supported by reasonable suspicion.45 The State relies on a 
phone call from Ms. Peoples the day before the probation search where 
she indicated that Peoples was using meth, may have overdosed, and that 
there was “lots of blood” in Peoples’ residence.46 The State maintains that, 
given the above information, P.O. Stricker had reasonable suspicion to 
conduct a search and that forced entry was required.47  
Second, the State argues that the probation search was reasonable 
and did not exceed its scope.48 The State contends that, given P.O. 
Stricker’s experience and relationship with Peoples, he was in the best 
position to determine whether entry was necessary to investigate a 
potential violation to support Peoples’ rehabilitative efforts and to protect 
society.49 The State asserts that a probationer expects to be “intensively” 
supervised, and given Peoples’ history of addiction and “law-breaking,” 
P.O. Stricker acted reasonably when he entered Peoples’ home after no 
one answered the door.50 
 
39 Id. at 17.  
40 Id. at 24. 
41 Id. at 24–25. 
42 Id. at 27. 
43 Id. at 28. 
44 Brief of Appellee, supra note 3, at 9. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 11. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 12. 
49 Id. at 12–13. 
50 Id. at 13–14. 




Third, the State argues that Peoples’ Opening Brief contains 
“factual inaccuracies and exaggerations” which does not comport with the 
record.51 The State asserts that officers did not coerce Peoples’ landlord, 
the intrusion was not violent when guns were “temporarily unholstered,” 
and Peoples was naked because he could have put clothes on and answered 
the door when officers knocked and announced.52 
 The State concludes that the probation search was supported by 
reasonable suspicion, and it did not exceed its scope. The State asks the 
Court to affirm the district court’s denial of Peoples’ motion to suppress.53  
IV. ANALYSIS 
The Court’s standard of review of a district court’s denial of a 
motion to suppress will likely be whether the court’s findings of fact are 
clearly erroneous and whether the court’s interpretation and application of 
the law is correct.54 First, the Court will need to determine whether 
reasonable suspicion justified the probation search. The Court will likely 
find that officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct a probation search 
of Peoples’ residence. Second, the Court will need to determine whether 
the nature of the State’s intrusion was constitutionally reasonable. The 
Court will likely hold that the search was unconstitutional because P.O. 
Stricker’s request was not reasonable, and the search was harassing and 
intimidating. Therefore, the Court will likely reverse the denial of Peoples’ 
motion to suppress evidence.  
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and 
Article II, Section 11 of the Montana Constitution protect citizens against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.55 Further, Article II, Section 10 of the 
Montana Constitution provides that the right of individual privacy shall 
not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest.56 
Montana’s unique constitution affords citizens a “greater right to privacy” 
and broader protection than the Fourth Amendment.57 To determine 
whether there has been an unlawful government intrusion into one’s 
privacy, the Court will analyze the following factors: (1) whether the 
person has an actual expectation of privacy; (2) whether society is willing 
 
51 Id. at 16. 
52 Id. at 16–18. 
53 Id. at 22. (The State’s Response Brief incorrectly refers to “Passmore’s requested relief.” The 
author edited the cited language to better fit their brief).  
54 Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 10 (citing State v. Conley, 415 P.3d 473, 475 (Mont. 2018)). 
55 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 11.  
56 MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10.  
57 Brief of Appellee, supra note 3, at 7 (citing State v. Elison, 14 P.3d 456, 468–69 (Mont. 2000)).  




to recognize that expectation as objectively reasonable; and (3) the nature 
of the State’s intrusion.58 
Long jurisprudence defines the rights of person on probation. A 
probationary sentence is a form of contract between the court and the 
probationer, “eliminating certain privacy expectations.”59 A probationer is 
aware that his “activities will be scrutinized.”60 However, a criminal 
conviction and probationary sentence does not “eviscerate all of the 
defendant’s rights of privacy.”61 Though a probationer has a reduced 
privacy interest, this does not “automatically mean a probationer has no 
privacy expectations.”62 
A. Reasonable Suspicion 
The Court must first determine whether reasonable suspicion 
justified the probation search. Generally, a search violates the Fourth 
Amendment if it is not conducted pursuant to a validly issued warrant 
supported by probable cause.63 Under Montana law, a valid search warrant 
must state facts showing probable cause made under oath and particular 
description of the things to be seized.64 Probable cause exists whether there 
is a reasonable belief that an offense has been committed and the evidence 
sought exists at the designated place.65 
The United States and Montana Constitutions draw a firm line at 
the entrance to a home.66 A warrantless search inside a home is per se 
unreasonable, “subject to a few specifically established and well-
delineated exceptions.”67 One such exception is a probation search.68 The 
“special needs” of supervision justify a departure from the “usual warrant 
and probable cause requirements.”69 A probation officer may conduct a 
warrantless search of a probationer’s residence if the officer has 
 
58 Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 12–13 (quoting State v. Therriault, 14 P.3d 444, 450 (Mont. 
2000)).  
59 Conley, 415 P.3d at 476 (citing State v. Burke, 766 P.2d 254, 257 (Mont. 1988)). 
60 Id.  
61 Id. (citing MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10; State v. Moody, 148 P.3d 662, 666 (Mont. 2006)). 
62 Id. 
63 Brief of Appellee, supra note 3, at 7 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)). 
64 MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-221 (2021).  
65 State v. Burchill, 454 P.3d 633, 639 (Mont. 2019). 
66 State v. Thomas, 471 P.3d 733, 737 (Mont. 2020); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980) 
(“[T]he Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house.”). 
67 Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 18 (citing State v. Hubbel, 951 P.2d 971 (Mont. 1997) 
(citations omitted)). 
68 State v. Burke, 766 P.2d 245, 256 (Mont. 1988) (adopting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 880 
(1987) (holding that the need for flexibility within the probation system and the special relationship 
existing between a probationer and his probation officer justified departing from the usual warrant 
requirement)). 
69 Id. (citing Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873–74). 




reasonable suspicion of a probation violation.70 The reasonable suspicion 
standard is substantially less than the probable cause standard because of 
the probationer’s diminished expectation of privacy.71 To require a warrant 
for a probation search would “artificially raise a probationer’s privacy 
interest to a level inconsistent with conditional liberty status.”72 The Court 
will determine whether sufficient grounds existed for reasonable suspicion 
by reviewing the totality of the circumstances.73  
The Court will likely not dedicate much time during oral argument 
discussing whether officers had reasonable suspicion, but rather what 
supported their reasonable suspicion. The State argues that Peoples’ past 
violations, the nature of his alleged probation violation, and the phone call 
from Ms. Peoples justified the probation search.74 However, Peoples does 
not dispute that the State had reasonable suspicion, rather, as discussed 
below, he disputes the proportionality of the search to the alleged 
probation violation—personal drug use and possible overdose.75  
Here, the Court will likely find that officers had reasonable 
suspicion of a probation violation to justify a warrantless search of 
Peoples’ residence. P.O. Stricker received a phone call from Ms. Peoples 
where she stated that Peoples was using drugs and may have overdosed.76 
She also stated that there was blood in his residence.77 Peoples does not 
dispute her credibility because in the past, her reports had often been 
confirmed to be true.78 With this report and his past understanding of 
Peoples’ addiction issues, P.O. Stricker likely had reasonable suspicion 
that Peoples violated a condition of his probation. 
B. The Nature of the State’s Intrusion 
The heart of oral argument will likely lie in discussing the 
relationship between the grounds for reasonable suspicion and the nature 
and conduct of the State’s search. This part of the analysis depends upon 
what facts supported P.O. Stricker’s reasonable suspicion and how those 
facts limit or expand the scope of a reasonable search. The outcome could 
further constrict a probationer’s already diminished expectation of privacy 
 
70 Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 18 (citing State v. Moody, 148 P.3d 662, 665 (Mont. 2006)).  
71 Brief of Appellee, supra note 3, at 10 (citing State v. Fischer, 323 P.3d 891, 894 (Mont. 2014)).  
72 Burke, 766 P.2d at 257. 
73 Brief of Appellee, supra note 3, at 10 (citing Fisher, 323 P.3d at 894; State v. Smith, 176 P.3d 
258, 261 (Mont. 2008) (abrogated on other grounds); State v. Stops, 301 P.3d 811 (Mont. 2013); 
State v. Fritz, 142 P.3d 806 (Mont. 2006)). 
74 Id. at 10–11. 
75 Reply Brief of Appellant at 13, State v. Peoples, (Mont. Apr. 12, 2021) (No. 19-0070). 
76 Brief of Appellee, supra note 3, at 6. 
77 Id. 
78 Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 5. 




during a probation search. However, the Court will likely hold the search 
unconstitutional because the nature of the State’s intrusion was 
unreasonable. 
A probation officer is in a “far superior” position than a judge to 
determine the appropriate degree of supervision because of their 
“continued experience with the probationer, knowledge of the original 
offense, with the probationer’s welfare in mind.”79 The probation officer 
determines the level of supervision “necessary to provide both 
rehabilitation of the probationer and safety for society.”80 This special 
relationship creates the justification for warrantless probation searches.81 
However, there must be a factual foundation justifying a probation search 
and the “search should not be used as an instrument of harassment or 
intimidation.”82 
At oral argument, Peoples will likely argue that the search of his 
home was both harassing and intimidating because it was disproportionate 
to the suspicion of drug use and possible overdose which initially justified 
the search.83 He will likely reiterate that the State’s justification does not 
support an intrusion that was pre-planned, approved for forced entry, 
supported by a U.S. Marshal, and involved deceiving his landlord for his 
apartment key.84 
The State will likely counter that P.O. Stricker’s experience and 
awareness of Peoples’ conviction history, repeated relapses, and past 
noncompliance issues justified his method of entry.85 More specifically, 
the State might argue that they were concerned by the report of blood86 
and that if Peoples was manufacturing his own meth, it would have created 
a dangerous situation.87 Also, once inside Peoples’ residence, officers 
conducted a homicide investigation which quickly cleared Peoples.88  
Here, the Court will likely agree with Peoples that P.O. Stricker’s 
probation search was unreasonable because the suspicion of drug use does 
not justify this type of intrusion and the search was harassing and 
intimidating. The Court has upheld probation searches as reasonable when 
they ripen from a home visit to a search after discovering additional 
 
79 Id. at 19 (quoting State v. Burke, 766 P.2d 254, 256 (Mont. 1988)).  
80 State v. Fischer, 323 P.3d 891, 894 (Mont. 2014). 
81 Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 19–20. 
82 Id. at 18–19 (quoting Burke, 766 P.2d at 256). 
83 Id. at 24. 
84 Id. at 22. 
85 Brief of Appellee, supra note 3, at 12–13. 
86 Id. at 11. 
87 Id. at 14–15. 
88 Id. at 18. 




information. In both State v. Fischer89 and State v. Stucker,90 probation 
officers requested and received permission to conduct a search of a 
probationer’s home after they discovered potential probation violations. In 
Fischer, a probation officer first conducted a home visit where Fischer 
admitted to multiple violations, which led to a search of her purse.91 The 
officer did not immediately conduct a search, rather, he initially requested 
to see her pills.92 In Stucker, Stucker consented to a home visit where two 
probation officers discovered weapons cases is plain view.93 Officers then 
requested Stucker to open the case, which he complied, and officers 
discovered a prohibited weapon.94 After discovering the weapon, officers 
conducted a search of his home for additional weapons.95 
The difference between this case and Fischer and Stucker is that 
Peoples did not answer his door.96 Unlike Fischer and Stucker, no 
probation officer actually requested permission to conduct a search, 
instead they knocked and announced their presence at Peoples’ front door. 
After Ms. Peoples’ report, P.O. Stricker did not call Peoples to check on 
him or to request a home visit.97 Because the Court has previously relied 
upon a probationer’s conditions of release when determining whether a 
search has occurred and whether the search was reasonable,98 here 
Peoples’ probation conditions will likely guide the Court’s decision. In 
relevant part, Peoples’ conditions of release require that “[h]e must submit, 
at any time, to a warrantless search of his residence . . . at the reasonable 
request of his supervising officer.”99 Since Peoples never answered and 
the search was harassing and intimidating, the Court will likely limit this 
type of search, holding it unreasonable. 
The Court has the opportunity to expand upon the meaning of a 
“harassing and intimidating” probation search. The Court has not held a 
probation search unconstitutional because it was harassing and 
intimidating. P.O. Stricker did not attempt to call Peoples or request a 
home visit prior to entry.100 After Peoples was handcuffed, he was left 
 
89 323 P.3d 891 (Mont. 2014). 
90 973 P.2d 835 (Mont. 1999). 
91 Fischer, 323 P.3d at 895. 
92 Id. 
93 Stucker, 973 P.2d at 841. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 24–25. 
97 Id. at 5. 
98 See, e.g., State v. Burke, 766 P.2d 254, 256–57 (Mont. 1988); State v. Fischer, 323 P.3d 891, 894 
(Mont. 2014); State v. Therriault, 14 P.3d 444, 453–54 (Mont. 2000); State v. Conley, 415 P.3d 473, 
476 (Mont. 2018). 
99 Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 2. 
100 Id. at 5. 




naked, on the floor, while officers searched his residence.101 P.O. Stricker 
testified that Peoples remained “calm and compliant” throughout, even 
while he remained naked and handcuffed.102 After about 30 minutes, 
another officer arrived and stated that they should put clothes on 
Peoples.103 The Court might find these facts persuasive and hold in 
Peoples’ favor that the search was both harassing and intimidating.  
The Court will likely question the State about P.O. Stricker’s 
primary reason for conducting the probation search to determine the 
reasonable level of intrusion. The suspicion of blood in Peoples’ residence 
triggered Probation and Parole’s request for forced entry permission.104 
However, the State asserts that P.O. Stricker’s reason for entering without 
Peoples’ permission was “based in part on a report of” blood and a possible 
overdose.105 And once inside Peoples’ residence, officers conducted a 
homicide investigation.106 However, the State also claims that if Peoples 
was operating a clandestine lab, it would have created a dangerous 
environment, even though the record does not contain evidence that 
Peoples’ apartment was actually contaminated.107 The Court will likely 
reject this hypothetical because, as the State admits, the record does not 
contain any evidence to suggest that P.O. Stricker believed Peoples was 
operating a clandestine lab.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Though probationers have a diminished expectation of privacy, 
their right to privacy is not extinguished. This case presents an opportunity 
for the Court to further clarify the privacy interests of a probationer. The 
Court will likely hold that officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct a 
probation search based on Peoples’ past addiction issues and Ms. Peoples’ 
report of drug use and possible overdose. Additionally, even though 
probation officers have discretion to supervise a probationer in a manner 
they see fit, that supervision must also be reasonable. The Court will likely 
hold the search was unreasonable because P.O. Stricker’s request was not 
reasonable, and the search was harassing and intimidating. Thus, the 
Montana Supreme Court will likely reverse the district court’s denial of 
Peoples’ motion to suppress and remand consistent with its opinion.  
 
101 Id. at 8. 
102 Id. 
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104 Id. at 6 n. 2. 
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106 Id. at 18. 
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